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I 
Name: Smith, David 
NY SID 
DIN: 13-B-1063 
STATE ·OF NEW YORK- BOARD OF PAROLE 
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE 
Facility: · 
Appeal 
Control No.: 
Wende CF 
08-008-18 B 
Appearances: Stephen Underwood Esq. 
1395 Union Road 
West Seneca, New York 14224 
Decision appealed: July 201 ~ decision, denying discretiona+Y release and imposing a hold of 24 months. 
Board Member(s) Berliner, Cruse 
who participated: 
Papers considered: Appellant's Briefreceived January 16, 2019 
Appeals Unit Review: Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation 
Records relied upon: Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole 
Board Release Decision Notice (Form 9026),. COMP AS instrument, Offender Case 
Plan. 
he undersigned determine that the decision appealed is hereby: 
_Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to ___ _ 
_ Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to ___ _ 
_ Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to ___ _ 
Commissioner 
If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit,:written 
reasons for the Parole Board's determination !!!!!ll be annexed hereto. 
This Final Determination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and the separ. te fi dings of 
the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Inmate and the Inmate's Counsel, if any, on ;- ~ •. 
Distribution: Appeals Unit-Appellant - Appellant's Counsel - Inst. Parole File - Central File 
P-2002(B) (11/2018) 
STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE 
APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION 
Name: Smith, David DIN: 13-B-1063  
Facility: Wende CF AC No.:  08-008-18 B 
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    Appellant challenges the July 2018 determination of the Board, denying release and imposing a 
24-month hold. Appellant raises the following claims: 1) the decision is arbitrary and capricious 
in that the Board failed to consider and/or properly weigh the required statutory factors. Appellant 
contends he has an excellent institutional record and release plan, but all the Board did was to look 
only at the instant offense/criminal history. 2) the Board ignored his EEC. 3) the Board decision 
lacks details. 4) no aggravating factors exist. 5) the decision lacks future guidance. 6) the decision 
illegally resentenced him. 7) the decision violation his constitutional liberty interest in early 
release. 8) the decision violated the due process clause of the constitution in that the Board’s 
deliberations were not recorded. 9) the Board decision violated the 2011 amendments to the 
Executive Law in that no TAP was done, and the COMPAS, which was positive in all but one 
category, was ignored. 
 
         Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider criteria which is relevant to the 
specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the inmate’s institutional record and criminal behavior.  
People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 
1983). Whereas here the inmate has received an EEC, the Board may deny release to parole on a 
finding that there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, the inmate will not 
live and remain at liberty without violating the law and that his release is not compatible with the 
welfare of society.  Correction Law § 805; Matter of Heitman v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 
214 A.D.2d 673, 625 N.Y.S.2d 264 (2d Dept. 1995); Matter of Salcedo v. Ross, 183 A.D.2d 771, 
771, 583 N.Y.S.2d 502, 503 (1st Dept. 1992); Matter of Walker v. Russi, 176 A.D.2d 1185, 576 
N.Y.S.2d 51 (3d Dept. 1991), appeal dismissed, 79 N.Y.2d 89 7, 581 N.Y.S.2d 660 (1992).  While 
consideration of these factors is mandatory, “the ultimate decision to parole a prisoner is 
discretionary.”  Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000).  
Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely within the Board’s 
discretion.  See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th 
Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 717; Matter of Garcia v. 
New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997).   
 
     The fact that the Board afforded greater weight to the inmate’s criminal history, as opposed to 
other positive factors, does not render the denial of parole for that reason irrational or improper.  
Matter of Davis v. Evans, 105 A.D.3d 1305, 963 N.Y.S.2d 485 (3d Dept. 2013); Matter of Lashway 
v. Evans, 110 A.D.3d 1417, 1418, 974 N.Y.S.2d 164, 165 (3d Dept. 2013); Matter of McKee v. New 
York State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204 (3d Dept. 1990).   
Although the Board placed particular emphasis on the nature of the crime, the Board considered 
other factors and was not required to give equal weight to or discuss each factor considered.  Matter 
of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016). 
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    The Board may cite an inmate’s prior history of irresponsible driving in its decision. Confoy v New 
York State Division of Parole, 173 A.D.2d 1014, 569 N.Y.S.2d 846, 847 (3d Dept 1991); Wade v 
Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1487, 52 N.Y.S.3d 508 (3d Dept. 2017). 
     The Board could consider a history of alcohol abuse in its decision. Mclain v New York State 
Division of Parole, 204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629, 630  (2d Dept 1994). 
     The Board may consider negative aspects of the COMPAS instrument.  Matter of Bush v. 
Annucci, 148 A.D.3d 1392, 50 N.Y.S.3d 180 (3d Dept. 2017) (COMPAS instrument with mixed 
results including substance abuse relevant given use before crime); Matter of Wade v. Stanford, 
148 A.D.3d 1487, 52 N.Y.S.3d 508 (3d Dept. 2017) (low risk felony violence but probable risk for 
substance abuse alcohol related crimes); Matter of Crawford v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 144 
A.D.3d 1308, 46 N.Y.S.3d 228 (3d Dept. 2016) (scores not uniformly low including family 
support), lv. denied, 29 N.Y.3d 901, 57 N.Y.S.3d 704 (2017).   
     An EEC does not automatically guarantee release or eliminate consideration of the statutory 
factors, including the instant offense.  Matter of Corley v. New York State Div. of Parole, 33 
A.D.3d 1142, 1143, 822 N.Y.S.2d 817, 818 (3d Dept. 2006); Matter of Pearl v. New York State 
Div. of Parole, 25 A.D.3d 1058, 808 N.Y.S.2d 816, 817 (3d Dept. 2006); Matter of White v. 
Dennison, 29 A.D.3d 1144, 814 N.Y.S.2d 393 (3d Dept. 2006). The Board acted within its 
discretion in determining these considerations rebutted any presumption created by the EEC and 
rendered discretionary release inappropriate at this time.   See generally Matter of Neal v. Stanford, 
131 A.D.3d 1320, 16 N.Y.S.3d 342 (3d Dept. 2015).  Although the inmate received an EEC which 
was considered, the Board was not required to give each factor equal weight and was entitled to 
place greater weight upon the danger presented by his repeated crimes, of intoxicated driving-
related criminal history. Matter of Wade v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1487, 52 N.Y.S.3d 508 (3d Dept. 
2017).   
 
    The Board’s decision satisfied the criteria set out in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a), as it was 
sufficiently detailed to inform the inmate of the reasons for the denial of parole.  Matter of Applegate 
v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of 
Kozlowski v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 108 A.D.3d 435, 968 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1st Dept. 2013); 
Matter of Little v. Travis, 15 A.D.3d 698, 788 N.Y.S.2d 628 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of Davis v. 
Travis, 292 A.D.2d 742, 739 N.Y.S.2d 300 (3d Dept. 2002); People ex rel. Herbert v. New York 
State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).   
    The Board may place greater weight on the nature of the crime without the existence of any 
aggravating factors.  Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 
N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014). 
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     As for Appellant’s complaint about lack of future guidance, the Board is not required to state 
what an inmate should do to improve his chances for parole in the future.  Matter of Francis v. New 
York State Div. of Parole, 89 A.D.3d 1312, 934 N.Y.S.2d 514 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Freeman 
v. New York State Div. of Parole, 21 A.D.3d 1174, 800 N.Y.S.2d 797 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of 
Partee v. Evans, 40 Misc.3d 896, 969 N.Y.S.2d 733 (Sup. Ct. Albany Co. 2013), aff’d, 117 A.D.3d 
1258, 984 N.Y.S.2d 894 (3d Dept. 2014), lv. denied, 24 N.Y.3d 901, 995 N.Y.S.2d 710 (2014).   
     Appellant’s assertion that the denial of parole release amounted to an improper resentencing is 
without merit inasmuch as the Board fulfilled its obligation to determine the propriety of release 
per Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) and after considering the factors set forth therein.  Executive 
Law § 259 et seq.; Penal Law § 70.40; Matter of Murray v. Evans, 83 A.D.3d 1320, 920 N.Y.S.2d 
745 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Crews v. New York State Exec. Dept. Bd. of Parole Appeals Unit, 
281 A.D.2d 672, 720 N.Y.S.2d 855 (3d Dept. 2001).  The Board was vested with discretion to 
determine whether release was appropriate notwithstanding the minimum period of incarceration 
set by the Court.  Matter of Burress v. Dennison, 37 A.D.3d 930, 829 N.Y.S.2d 283 (3d Dept. 
2007); Matter of Cody v. Dennison, 33 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 822 N.Y.S.2d 677 (3d Dept. 2006), lv. 
denied, 8 N.Y.3d 802, 830 N.Y.S.2d 698 (2007).  The appellant has not in any manner been 
resentenced.  Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 
N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016). 
     An inmate has no Constitutional right to be conditionally released on parole before expiration 
of a valid sentence.  Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 
1, 99 S. Ct. 2100, 2104 (1979); Matter of Russo v. Bd. of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 
(1980); Matter of Vineski v. Travis, 244 A.D.2d 737, 664 N.Y.S.2d 391 (3d Dept. 1997).  The 
New York State parole scheme “holds out no more than a possibility of parole” and thus does not 
create a protected liberty interest implicating the due process clause.  Matter of Russo, 50 N.Y.2d 
at 75-76, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 985; see also Barna v. Travis, 239 F.3d 169, 171 (2d Cir. 2001); Matter 
of Freeman v. New York State Div. of Parole, 21 A.D.3d 1174, 800 N.Y.S.2d 797 (3d Dept. 2005). 
Accordingly, appellant has no liberty interest in parole. Duemmel v Fischer, 368 Fed.Appx. 180, 
182 (2d Cir. 2010); Davis v Dennison, 219 Fed Appx 68 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. den. 552 U.S. 863, 
128 S.Ct. 151, 169 Led2d 103 (2007); Rodriguez v Alexander, 71 A.D.3d 1354, 896 N.Y.S.2d 693 
(3d Dept. 2010), lv. den. 15 N.Y.3d 703, 906 N.Y.S.2d 817. Thus, the protections of the due 
process clause are inapplicable. Barna v Travis, 239 F.3d 169, 171 (2d Cir. 2001); Freeman v New 
York State Division of Parole, 21 A.D.3d 1174, 800 N.Y.S.2d 797 (3d Dept 2005); Watson v New 
York State Board of Parole, 78 A.D.3d 1367, 910 N.Y.S.2d 311 (3d Dept. 2010).  
     Completion of the minimum term of the sentence still does not create any protected liberty 
interest. Motti v Alexander, 54 A.D.3d 1114, 1115 (3d Dept. 2008). 
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     Nothing in the due process clause requires the Parole Board to specify the particular evidence 
on which rests the discretionary determination an inmate is not ready for conditional release. 
Duemmel v Fischer, 368 Fed.Appx. 180, 182 (2d Cir. 2010). There is no due process requirement 
that the Parole Board disclose its release criteria.  Haymes v Regan, 525 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1975).    
The due process clause is not violated by the Board’s balancing of the statutory criteria, and which 
is not to be second guessed by the courts. Mathie v Dennison, 2007 WL 2351072 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); 
MacKenzie v Cunningham, 2014 WL 5089395 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
    Parole is not constitutionally based, but is a creature of statute which may be imposed subject to 
conditions imposed by the state legislature. Banks v Stanford, 159 A.D.3d 134, 71 N.Y.S.3d 515 
(2d Dept. 2018).   
     “[D]enial is neither arbitrary nor capricious when the Board relies on factors defined by New 
York statute.”  Siao-Paul v. Connolly, 564 F. Supp. 2d 232, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).         Denial of 
parole is neither arbitrary nor capricious when the Parole Board relied on the factors defined by the 
New York statute. Hodge v Griffin, 2014 WL 2453333(S.D.N.Y. 2014) citing Romer v Travis, 
2003 WL 21744079.  An arbitrary action is one without sound basis in reason and without regard 
to the facts. Rationality is what is reviewed under an arbitrary and capricious standard. Hamilton 
v New York State Division of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014). An 
action is arbitrary and capricious when it is taken without sound basis in reason or regard to the 
facts. Ward v City of Long Beach, 20 N.Y.3d 1042 (2013).  
    In the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory 
factors, it must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty.  Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 
A.D.2d 914, 914, 680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); Matter of McLain v. New York State 
Div. of Parole, 204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); Matter of McKee v. New York 
State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); People ex rel. 
Herbert, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881.      
     There is no due process requirement that the internal deliberations or discussions of the Board 
appear on the record.  Matter of Barnes v. New York State Div. of Parole, 53 A.D.3d 1012, 862 
N.Y.S.2d 639 (3d Dept. 2008); Matter of Borcsok v. New York State Div. of Parole, 34 A.D.3d 
961, 823 N.Y.S.2d 310 (3d Dept. 2006); Matter of Collins v. Hammock, 96 A.D.2d 733, 465 
N.Y.S.2d 84 (4th Dept. 1983). 
     Appellant’s claim that the Board failed to comply with the 2011 amendments to the Executive 
Law is rejected. Dolan v New York State Board of Parole, 122 A.D.3d 1058, 995 N.Y.S.2d 850 (3d 
Dept. 2014); Tran v Evans, 126 A.D.3d 1196, 3 N.Y.S.3d 633 (3d Dept. 2015); Boccadisi v Stanford, 
133 A.D.3d 1169, 20 N.Y.S.3d 477 (3d Dept. 2015).      The 2011 amendments to the Executive Law, 
as well as the state regulations governing parole, do not create a legitimate expectancy of release that 
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would give rise to a due process interest in parole. Fuller v Evans, 586 Fed.Appx. 825 (2d Cir. 2014) 
cert.den. 135 S.Ct. 2807, 192 L.Ed2d 851. 
     The name of the Transitional Accountability Plan was changed to “Offender Case Plan.”  The 
existing regulations already refer to and require consideration of the “case plan.”  9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 
8002.2(b).1  Accordingly, no further regulation is required.  An Offender Case Plan was prepared for 
Appellant and made available to the Board at the time of the interview. The Board is not required to 
give the COMPAS and case plan greater weight than the other factors.  Matter of Gonzalvo v. 
Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017). 
 
Recommendation:  Affirm. 
                                                 
1 NOTE TO BOP ATTORNEYS:  For interviews conducted before the 2017 amendments, the provision was found in 
9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.3(a)(12) (2014). 
